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AbstrAct
Children created through mitochondrial replacement 
techniques (MRTs) are commonly presented as 
possessing 50% of their mother’s nuclear DNA, 50% 
of their father’s nuclear DNA and the mitochondrial 
DNA of an egg donor. This lab-engineered genetic 
composition has prompted two questions: Do children 
who are the product of an MRT procedure have three 
genetic parents? And, do MRT egg donors have parental 
responsibilities for the children created? In this paper, 
I address the second question and in doing so I also 
address the first one. First, I present a brief account of 
mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. Second, I examine how 
MRTs affect the numerical identity of eggs and zygotes. 
Third, I investigate two genetic accounts of parenthood 
and MRT egg donation. Fourth, I explore three causal 
accounts of parenthood and MRT egg donation. My 
conclusion is that, under the appropriate circumstances, 
MRT egg donors are parentally responsible for the 
children created under genetic accounts of parenthood 
and under causal accounts of parenthood.
IntroductIon
Children created through mitochondrial replace-
ment techniques (MRTs) are commonly presented 
as possessing 50% of their mother’s nuclear DNA 
(nDNA), 50% of their father’s nDNA and the mito-
chondrial DNA (mtDNA) of an egg donor.i This 
lab-engineered genetic composition prompts two 
questions, among others: Do children who are the 
product of an MRT procedure have three genetic 
parents? And, do MRT egg donors have parental 
responsibilities for the children created?
The academic discussion that is most closely 
related to the above questions is based on whether 
MRT egg donation should be anonymous or not.1–6 
This discussion was primarily prompted because 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCoB) report 
on MRTs,7 and the UK’s Human Fertilisation & 
Embryology Authority 2015 document Mitochon-
dria replacement consultation: advice to Govern-
ment8 described how some respondents argued 
that given that mitochondria are not responsible 
for conferring personal characteristics, beyond 
health, then the egg donor should be anonymous. 
In the end, the UK’s regulation on MRTs followed 
i Three things should be clear. The egg donor provides 
all the cellular machinery except the nuclear DNA. The 
total percentage of mtDNA provided by the egg donor can 
vary depending on the amount of mtDNA carryover that 
occurs during the MRT.33 34 The term ‘egg donor’ here 
should be understood as referring to people who donate 
their eggs and people who sell their eggs.
the Department of Health Response Document’s9 
recommendations, which held a line similar to that 
of the previously mentioned respondents, and made 
MRT egg donation anonymous.10
Here, I distance myself from the anonymity 
debate and instead investigate if an MRT egg donor 
is parentally responsible for the created child. 
There are multiple ways in which I could explore 
this question, and exploring whether MRT egg 
donors are parentally responsible on each account 
of parental responsibilities would require much 
more space that is available here. Instead, I explore 
MRT egg donation according to two of the most 
prominent accounts of parental responsibilities: 
genetic accounts of parenthood (henceforth genetic 
accounts) and causal accounts of parenthood 
(henceforth causal accounts). Even if we maintain 
that monistic accounts of parenthood are bound to 
fail, such as Bayne and Kolers do, exploring these 
particular parenthood accounts is useful given that 
any pluralistic account ‘ought to be broad enough 
to grant parenthood to [causal], genetic, gesta-
tional, custodial and intentional parents’.11
This paper adds to the current ethical debate 
on MRTs in several ways. First, it further critically 
examines the mainstream position on the relation 
between mitochondria and parenthood. Second, it 
tackles in a systematic way the philosophical ques-
tion if MRT egg donors are parentally responsible 
for the created children. Third, it opens the door 
to carry on future research on MRTs and lesbian 
motherhood. Finally, by showing that under 
certain circumstances MRT egg donors are paren-
tally responsible for the children created we are 
in a better position to formulate adequate policies 
regarding the egg-donation process for  MRTs.ii
Mitochondrial diseases and Mrtsiii
mtDNA diseases occur when problems within the 
genes of the mitochondria prevent them from 
producing the levels of energy that cells need to 
work properly. They are a group of neuromus-
cular diseases that can have mild to devastating 
effects. They cause, for example, heart and major 
organ failure, dementia, stroke, blindness, deaf-
ness, infant encephalopathy and premature death.12 
ii  In this paper, I am only concerned with the question if 
MRT egg donors are parentally responsible for the created 
children. Thus, I will not discuss what are the contents of 
these parental responsibilities.
iii  This section draws from Palacios-González’s work on 
MRTs.35 36
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Mitochondria are inherited via the maternal  line.iv Pathological 
mutations in the mtDNA can be present either in all mitochondria 
(homoplasmy), or only in some mitochondria (heteroplasmy).
Recently, two MRTsv have been developed in order to help 
women with mtDNA diseases to have genetically related chil-
dren absent such conditions: maternal spindle transfer (MST) 
and pronuclear transfer (PNT). In MST, assisted reproductive 
techniques are used to obtain eggs from the intending mother 
and a healthy donor. The chromosomes from the donor’s oocyte 
and the intending mother’s oocyte are then extracted. While the 
donor’s chromosomes and the intending mother’s enucleated 
oocyte are discarded, the intending mother’s chromosomes are 
transferred to the now enucleated donor’s  oocyte.vi Afterwards, 
the reconstructed oocyte is fertilised in vitro and then trans-
ferred to the intending mother or a surrogate.7 13
In PNT two zygotes are created in vitro. One of them is 
created with the intending parents’ sperm and oocyte (or a 
sperm from a donor), and the other one with a donated oocyte 
and the father’s (or donor’s) sperm. After fertilisation, and 
during the first 24 hours, the maternal and paternal pronuclei 
are removed from both zygotes. The enucleated cell that was 
produced with the intending mother’s oocyte and the pronuclei 
that were contained in the cell produced with the donor’s oocyte 
are discarded. Subsequently, the intending parents’ (or donor’s 
and intending mother’s) pronuclei are transferred to the enucle-
ated cell produced with the donor’s oocyte. The reconstructed 
zygote is then transferred to the intending mother or a surro-
gate.7 14 In both techniques, the donor’s healthy mitochondria 
will be passed down via the maternal line to subsequent genera-
tions, if everything goes as expected.
numerical identity and Mrts
In order to discuss causal and genetic accounts of parenthood, 
we need first to understand how MRTs affect the identity of eggs 
and oocytes. Let us start with the difference between qualitative 
identity and numerical identity. Qualitative identity indicates 
to the fact that two entities share certain properties, things can 
be qualitatively identical in different degrees. For example, we 
would say that two phones are qualitatively identical if they were 
produced by the same company, have the same type of chips, are 
the same model, etc, but without them being one and the same 
object. Numerical identity is only held between a thing and itself. 
For example, Mary Shelly is numerically identical to the woman 
who wrote Frankenstein, they are one and the same person.
Once we have pointed this out, and before we can ask whether 
MRTs affect numerical identity or qualitative identity, we need 
to explicitly state what kind of things eggs and zygotes are. 
According to Matthew Liao’s account of the Organism View, 
an oocyte is essentially a cell, and a zygote is essentially an 
organism.15–17
That eggs are essentially cells entails: (1) that they begin to 
exist when the capacity to regulate and coordinate the various 
iv  Only one case of mitochondrial DNA inheritance via the paternal line 
has been documented in the academic literature.37
v  As I have said elsewhere: "Even though the name ‘mitochondrial 
replacement techniques’ is controversial, I use it because it has secured a 
place within the academic debate. The name is controversial because the 
techniques transfer nuclear DNA and thus a better term would be ‘nuclear 
replacement techniques".36 Ainsley Newson and Anthony Wrigley have 
recently proposed and defended the term ‘mitochondrial targeting 
techniques’.38
vi  During the chromosome transfer, there can be unintentional carryover 
of pathological mitochondria. A mtDNA disease could manifest if the 
pathological mitochondria carryover is substantive.33 34
life processes is there; (2) persist as long as there is a continuing 
ability to regulate and coordinate the various life processes (ie, 
cellular continuity) and (3) cease to exist when the capacity to 
regulate and coordinate the various life processes ceases to be.17 
Zygotes come to be as organisms and cease to exist when they 
are no longer organisms. A zygote begins to exist when: (1) the 
capacity to regulate and coordinate the various life processes 
is there; (2) persists as long as there is ‘organismic continuity’, 
which is the continuing ability to regulate and coordinate the 
various life processes and (3) ceases to exist when the capacity 
to regulate and coordinate the various life processes ceases to 
be.17-vii -viii
If we grant the above then we have to accept that both MST 
and PNT affect the numerical identity of eggs and zygotes. They 
do so because ‘the same coordinating and regulating capacity 
of the various life processes such as metabolism, growth, differ-
entiation and so on’ does not persist after MST, or PNT, takes 
place.17 It does not do so because mitochondria, and not only 
nuclear DNA, are essential for the coordination and regulation 
of the different life processes: i) the cytoplasm of egg (or zygote) 
X, where the mitochondria resides, also contains crucial compo-
nents for regulating and coordinating the various life processes 
and ii) there are life processes in the cytoplasm of egg (or zygote) 
X that the nucleus of egg (or zygote) X does not (at least have 
full) control.17
This means that when we enucleate egg (or zygote) X we 
disrupt its cellular (or organismic) continuity, and thus when we 
transfer the nuclear material to the enucleated egg (or zygote) 
Y a new coordinating and regulating capacity comes to be and 
thus we create a numerically distinct egg (or zygote) Z. What 
is relevant for our discussion is that this particular MST egg 
(or PNT zygote) would not have existed but for MST and 
PNT taking  place.ix Now, someone could argue that under the 
Organism View an MRT results in a qualitative change rather 
than a numerical one. According to the objector, the numerical 
identity of the egg (or zygote) does not change because it is not 
necessary that the ‘same’ regulating capacity persists, but rather 
that ‘a’ regulating capacity does. The problem with this objection 
is that, in Eric Olson’s words, an organism ‘persists just in case 
its capacity to direct those vital functions that keep it biologically 
alive is not disrupted (emphasis added)’.18 When such regulating 
capacity is destroyed (during the MRT process), the organism, 
qua organism, is destroyed, and thus a new numerically distinct 
organism comes into being after the MRT process. The only way 
in which the same numerical egg (or zygote) could persist is if the 
enucleation process was promptly reversed.
Genetic accounts of parental responsibilities
The news cycle around the birth of the first baby product of 
MST was full of headlines that included phrases like: ‘three 
parent baby’ or ‘three person baby’.19–21 The underlying assump-
tion is that children who are the product of MRTs do have three 
genetics parents, but do they?
According to John Harris they do not: ‘Although children 
might be confused if they are told that they have three genetic 
vii  Anthony Wrigley et al seem to hold that cells and zygotes are essen-
tially their nDNA and therefore that numerical identity follows the 
nuclear genome.39
viii  In his work on the Organism View, Liao does not explore on the 
differences between cells and organisms.
ix  An MST egg is the end result of ‘the process of MST’ and a PNT zygote 
is the end result of ‘the process of PNT’; ‘process’ here entails the enucle-
ation, transfer and reconstitution actions.36
group.bmj.com on October 26, 2017 - Published by http://jme.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
3Palacios-González C. J Med Ethics 2017;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/medethics-2017-104400
Reproductive ethics
parents, only a very confused person would think—let alone 
say—any such thing’.4 The NCoB has also stated that ‘it is the 
view of the Working Group that mitochondrial donation does 
not indicate, either biologically or legally, any notion of the child 
having either a "third parent", or "second mother"’.22 Now, Harris 
argues his view on two grounds: mitochondria make up <1% of 
the total DNA, and they do not confer personal features (save 
for the susceptibility to avoid disease and suffering). Thus, for 
him, in order to be a genetic parent one needs to provide more 
genetic material than the total percentage of mtDNA one, and 
the genetic material that one provides must confer personal 
features (eg, skin colour). John Appleby has named these two 
claims about genetic contribution: the quantity claim and the 
quality claim.1 Neither Appleby nor Harris have investigated 
how these claims interact with each other. For example, is one 
a genetic parent if one only provides 2% of the total nuclear 
genetic material, but such material is solely responsible for the 
child’s facial features (supposing there are such ‘face’ genes)?
On the other side of the debate, we find those who assert that 
children who are the product of an MRT procedure do have three 
genetic parents. For example, Rebecca Dimond has claimed that 
‘focusing on biology alone suggests that all babies born through 
these techniques would be triparental’.23 According to her, this 
is the case because there is transmission of DNA, in this case 
mtDNA. Others who have endorsed this view are Jacques Cohen 
and Mina Alikani,24 and Françoise Baylis.25 Now, in order to 
explore this issue in more depth let us turn to what does it mean 
to be a genetic parent, by investigating genetic accounts.
According to genetic accounts, the genetic link that exists 
between a parent and her child grounds parental responsibili-
ties. Parental responsibilities, in their more basic sense, should 
be understood as the nurturing, caring and raising responsibili-
ties that a competent adult has towards an infant. The ‘parental 
genetic link’ can be understood in at least two different ways. 
First, A possesses a parental genetic link to B if half of A’s genetic 
material is present in B. Let us call this the ‘fractional account’. 
Second, C possesses a genetic link to D if C’s genetic material 
was derived from D’s genetic material. Let us call this the ‘deri-
vation account’.
The main problem with the fractional account is that half 
of A’s genetic material is also present in B’s identical twin E, 
and thus according to it both B and E are equally parentally 
responsible for A. Given the absurdity of the former, we can 
confidently conclude that the fractional account is false and that 
merely sharing half of one’s genetic material with someone is not 
a sufficient condition for establishing parental responsibilities.x 
It is also the case that sharing half of one’s genetic material is not 
a necessary condition for establishing parental responsibilities, as 
evidenced by adoption cases.
The derivation account maintains that one is parentally 
responsible for a child if the child’s genetic makeup was mate-
rially derived from one’s genetic  makeup.xi This account, as 
Austin identifies, can solve the identical twin problem because 
it ‘contains the concept of causation’.26 E is not parentally 
responsible for A since A was (partially) derived from B’s genetic 
material. Even though the former seems promising, we must 
specify that mere genetic derivation is not a sufficient condition 
for establishing parental responsibilities, because if it were the 
case then the following absurd scenario, let us call if ‘theft’, 
x Avery Kolers40 and Robert Sparrow41 have explored this issue in rela-
tion to reproductive cloning.
xi  Just as in the fractional account, genetic derivation is not necessary for 
establishing parental responsibilities.
would be true: F has some eggs stored in an in vitro fertilisa-
tion (IVF) clinic. G breaks into the clinic and steals F’s eggs; G 
fertilises them with his sperm and then enters into a surrogacy 
agreement after which baby H is born. F is parentally respon-
sible for H because H was genetically derived from F. Given this 
problem, we can modify the genetic/derivation account so that 
it can adequately deal with ‘theft’. Genetic/derivation account*: 
the parental genetic-link that exists between A and B grounds 
parental responsibilities if the act that gave rise to the genetic 
derivation was one that B consented to in an informed way.
At this point, it might be tempting to think that according 
to the genetic/derivation account*, MRT egg donation does 
not establish parental responsibilities. It could be tempting to 
think so given that in ‘standard’ genetic derivation cases (ie, 
human sexual reproduction), one member of the couple provides 
50% of the nuclear material and the other one the other 50% 
and all the mtDNA. Reaching this conclusion would be a mistake 
because the concept of genetic derivation does not necessarily 
entail that the derivation must happen as it ‘naturally’ occurs 
in humans. Consider the following hypothetical case: a scien-
tist genetically modifies four zygotes so when they grow into 
adults their gametes will only contain 25% of the normal human 
nuclear material. At some point during their adulthood, these 
four people decide to have a child; they call the same scientist 
and she helps them create an embryo. Three of them provide 
75% of the nuclear material and the other one provides 25% of 
the nuclear material and all the mtDNA. In this scenario, the four 
people would be parentally responsible for the child, since the 
child was derived from genetic material that they consented to 
provide. The former conclusion would stand even if we modify 
the above case so that two people provided 40% of the nuclear 
material each and the other two provided 10% each plus the 
mtDNA. And it would even stand, according to the derivation 
account, if 100 people donated 1% of the nuclear material and 
another one all the mtDNA.
If what I have said above is correct then according to the 
genetic/derivation account*, an MRT egg donor would be 
parentally responsible for the created child, given that the child 
is genetically derived from her, in that she provided a percentage 
of the total genetic material. At this point, I must emphasise that 
the percentage of derived genetic material is inconsequential; 
what is important is the genetic derivation which will be a cause 
of the child’s existence. Someone could object to my conclusion 
that it merely relies on the quantitative aspect of DNA, and that 
what matters in genetic derivation is the qualitative aspect of the 
derived genes.
According to this alternative interpretation of the genetic/
derivation account*, what grounds parentally responsibilities is 
the genetic derivation that confers personal characteristics (eg, 
appearance and psychological traits) to the created child. As 
previously said, the mainstream position is that mitochondria 
do not confer personal characteristics and therefore MRT egg 
donors are not parentally responsible for the created child. There 
are two problems with this objection when applied to MRTs. 
First, it seems probable that mitochondrial function determines 
certain personal characteristics, as Reuven Brandt asserts: ‘There 
is a growing body of research associating specific mtDNA vari-
ants with particular phenotypic traits including personality, 
psychological disorder and propensity for developing degenera-
tive neurological diseases’.2 Now, even if it turned out that there 
is no relation between mtDNA variants and non-pathological 
personality traits it must be obvious that health, including bodily 
health, is a personal characteristic, as Annelien Bredenoord et 
al assert when counterfactually comparing someone with, and 
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without, a mtDNA disease: ‘a person without a mtDNA disease 
will have a different life experience, a different biography and 
perhaps also a different character’.27 Advocates of the ‘personal 
characteristics’ position need to explain why health is not a 
personal characteristic. Second, and most important, in standard 
human reproductive scenarios we would maintain that both 
progenitors are parental responsible for a created child even if 
we discovered that only one of them provided the genes that 
determined personal characteristics. For example, if it were the 
case that the sperm provided only non-personal characteristics.
Even though I have concluded that under the genetic/deriva-
tion account* an MRT egg donor is parentally responsible for 
the created child, this account, as a unified account of parental 
responsibilities, is flawed given that it is unable to assign parental 
responsibility in certain cases, for example, in the case of ‘arti-
ficial gametes’. A researcher has been able to create human eggs 
and sperm from scratch, in the sense that she created them by 
using organic matter that did not originate in human organisms 
or cells. Let us specify that the genetic material of each gamete is 
a completely novel combination. Now imagine that she produces 
an embryo with these gametes and transfers it to herself, and 
that later a baby is born. Confronted with this case we have two 
options: a) we accept that no one is parentally responsible for 
such a child because the gametes were not derived from a human, 
which is absurd or b) we accept that the scientist has parental 
responsibilities towards the child. If we accept the latter, then 
it becomes even more clear that causation plays a large role in 
determining parental responsibilities. Thus, let us turn to causal 
accounts of parenthood.
causal accounts of parental responsibilities
In the most general sense, a causal account holds that X is 
parentally responsible for Y if X caused Y to exist. The origin 
of this responsibility is grounded on the fact that we are morally 
responsible for what we cause, and in reproductive scenarios we 
cause the existence of a vulnerable needy being that requires 
sustained care and nurturing. Failure to provide, or see that 
others provide, such care would cause pain and harm for which 
we would be morally responsible. As Henry Sidgwick states, ‘For 
the parent, being the cause of the child’s existing in a helpless 
condition, would be indirectly the cause of the suffering and 
death that would result to it if neglected’.28 Given the breadth of 
causal accounts in the next subsections I will only focus on three 
of them and examine whether MRT egg donors are parentally 
responsible for the created children.
Mere causal account of parenthood
A mere causal account maintains, as previously said, that X is 
parentally responsible for Y if X caused Y to exist. Causation 
here should be understood counterfactually: if A had not 
happened, B would not have happened. In order to illustrate this 
account let us imagine the following scenario, that we shall call 
‘sex’: imagine a couple who freely decides to have sex and that 
as a result of this begets a child. According to the mere causal 
account, both members of the couple are parentally responsible 
for the child, in that if they had not had sex when they had it 
then the child would not have existed.
Let us apply this account to an MRT egg donation case. 
Suppose that couple A relies on PNT for having a child who 
is not afflicted by a mtDNA disease, let us call this child B. 
In this scenario, the egg that was used to produce the zygote 
with healthy mitochondria was donated by woman C. Now, if 
woman C had not donated this particular egg then child B would 
not have existed. This is so because the numerical identity of 
B depends on the transfer of the intending parents’ pronuclei 
into the enucleated zygote produced with C’s egg, as previously 
explained. If, alternatively, we had used D’s egg then a numer-
ically distinct child, child E, would have been created. We can 
conclude that the MRT egg donor, under a mere causal account, 
has parental responsibilities towards B, in that B would not have 
existed if C had not donated that specific egg.
The mere causal account has been criticised because it is overly 
reaching, in that it assigns parental responsibilities to too many 
agents. For example, imagine that the couple in ‘sex’ decides to 
beget in the ‘Lovely Hotel’. Unfortunately for them, the only 
way to get to it is by bus and there is only one bus service every 
day to the hotel and back. Suppose that the couple rides the 
bus, gets to the hotel and begets child F. In this scenario, the bus 
driver would also be parentally responsible for F. She would also 
be so because F would not have existed but for her driving the 
couple to the Lovely Hotel.
The mere causal account has also been criticised because it 
provides the wrong results in cases of proximal causation. For 
example, imagine a scenario that we will call ‘lab confusion’: 
a man goes to his doctor because he thinks he has a low sperm 
count. The doctor asks for a semen sample and sends it to a 
lab. In the lab, a technician accidentally uses this sample in an 
IVF procedure and an embryo is produced. The embryo is trans-
ferred to a woman and child G is born. According to the mere 
causal account, the man who thinks he has a low sperm count is 
parentally responsible for G. This is because G would not have 
existed but for him providing a sperm sample to his doctor. 
Given these two salient problems with the mere causal account, 
it has been deemed as an inadequate account of parenthood, 
prompting some to propose revised versions of it.
candidate parenthood
Giuliana Fuscaldo has proposed an amended causal account of 
parenthood that she calls ‘candidate parenthood’. According 
to her, ‘an account of how moral responsibility for children is 
generated should be consistent with at least the standard views 
about causation, consequences and moral responsibility’.29 Such 
an account seems reasonable as it is true that we are not morally 
responsible for everything we are causally connected to.
There are two commonly accepted conditions for establishing 
moral responsibility: foreseeability and freedom. Freedom: ‘we 
are not responsible for actions that are unavoidable, or in situ-
ations where we are not free to do otherwise’.29 Foreseeability: 
we can be held accountable for the consequences of our actions 
‘if a reasonable person would have reason to expect that they 
might occur’.29 But, what does ‘free’ mean and who is a ‘reason-
able person’? Fuscaldo asserts that for an action to be free either 
an agent could have done otherwise or, if no alternative was 
possible, she reflectively sanctioned or appropriated her actions. 
Defining who is a reasonable person, on the other hand, is more 
complicated and would divert us from the present discussion. 
Nonetheless, we can confidently assert that all reasonable people 
understand a) that the creation of a child might be a consequence 
of us providing gametes for a reproductive endeavour and that 
b) a child might be created by an heterosexual couple having 
unprotected vaginal sex. At this point, we can assert that: ‘we are 
morally accountable for the intended and unintended reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of our free actions’.29 When we apply 
these two conditions of moral responsibility to reproductive 
scenarios, we have what Fuscaldo calls candidate parenthood: 
‘any (free) action that reasonably foreseeably results in the birth 
of a child generates responsibilities for that child’.29 On this 
account, ‘standard’ gamete donation, where there is informed 
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consent, generates parental responsibilities. It does so in that the 
creation of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
donation of sperm or eggs.
Let us now examine an MRT egg donation in relation to candi-
date parenthood. According to candidate parenthood, the woman 
with whose healthy egg an MRT procedure is carried out can either 
be parentally responsible for the created child, or not. She would 
be parentally responsible in those cases where it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the consequence of her free action would be the 
creation of a child, for example, if she donated her eggs with due 
informed consent, as would be the standard case in the UK.10 On 
the other hand, she would not be parentally responsible in those 
scenarios where it was not reasonably foreseeable that the conse-
quence of her action would be the creation of a child. Consider 
the following case: after a cancer diagnosis a woman undergoes 
the total removal of her reproductive system. Unbeknown to her, 
some of her eggs are used for an MRT procedure and a child is 
created. According to candidate parenthood, such a woman is 
not paternally responsible for the created child. This is because 
it is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of undergoing this 
surgery that your eggs will later on be used for such a reproductive 
endeavour.
Even though Fuscaldo’s candidate parenthood account has 
many advantages over a mere causal account, in that, for example, 
it does not assign parental responsibilities to those who acted 
under duress, it has the downside that it too assigns parental 
responsibilities to too many actors. For example, imagine a 
scenario that we shall call ‘A Lovely Ride’, which is a modified 
version of ‘Lovely Hotel’: in this setup, the couple arrives at the 
bus station just as the bus is returning from the hotel. The driver 
tells them that they will have to wait until tomorrow. Suppose 
that the couple talks the driver into driving them to the hotel. 
They tell her that they intend to have sex and beget a child that 
night, and just how much it would mean for them if she could 
take them. The driver, breaking the rules and in her own free 
time, freely accepts to give them a ride to the hotel where the 
couple in fact begets a child. Now, in this scenario the bus driver 
is parentally responsible for the created child; she is so in that 
the creation of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of her driving the couple to the hotel. This is because the couple 
explicitly told her what they intended to do and she freely took 
them. That in ‘A Lovely Ride’ the driver is parentally responsible 
for the child is highly counterintuitive.
Fuscaldo replies to the above kind of worry stating that 
‘no one is suggesting that IVF scientists or clinicians have 
duties for all of the children they help to bring about’.29 Even 
if she does not suggest this she cannot scape this consequence, 
since the conditions established by candidate parenthood 
are attained in such cases. The way out of the conundrum is 
to argue that parental responsibilities can be transferred or 
delegated and therefore MRT egg donors, gamete providers, 
bus drivers and IVF scientists can in fact transfer or delegate 
theirs.30
A bifurcated causal account of parenthood
Lindsey Porter has proposed another version of a causal account 
of parenthood, which she calls the ‘bifurcated causal account 
of parenthood’. According to it, ‘causing a child to come into 
existence places one in a distinct moral role to which obliga-
tion attaches, but does not make one a parent; while occupying 
the role ‘parent’ also obliges one to one’s child(ren)’.31 On this 
account being a ‘maker’ (ie, the one who causes the child to exist) 
carries pro tanto duties to take on the role of a parent (ie, social/
moral parent), but these duties are  defeasible.xii Furthermore, 
being a maker should not be understood as only limited to those 
who provide the gametes with which the embryo is produced, 
but also comprises other agents who cause the child’s existence, 
such as, in the case of gamete donation, the intending parents. 
In order to determine who is a causal agent, Porter assumes John 
Leslie Mackie’s32 conceptualisation of causation, according to 
which causes are at a minimum INUS conditions: Insufficient 
but Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary 
but Sufficient.
Now, a maker’s obligation towards a child is ‘roughly, the 
obligation to make the child’s existence a good one to the extent 
that one can’.31 This entails that makers have an obligation to 
enter into the role of social/moral parent when those who were 
supposed to occupy it can no longer do so. Thus, given that 
gamete donors are ‘makers’, they have morally weighty respon-
sibilities. It must be clear that Porter’s account suffers from the 
same overinclusiveness problem as Fuscaldo’s one, the only 
difference being the type of responsibilities that ‘makers’ have.
Let us turn to MRTs. Under the bifurcated causal account of 
parenthood MRT egg donors are ‘makers’. This is because the 
egg donation is an insufficient (because we need another egg, or 
zygote) but necessary (if we change the egg donor a numerically 
distinct child would be created) part of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary (the couple could just adopt a healthy child) but 
sufficient for the child to be created. This being the case, we can 
confidently assert that, under this account of parenthood, MRT 
egg donors have defeasible pro tanto duties towards the created 
children when the donation was carried out with informed 
consent. In other words, an MRT egg donor has a parental 
moral obligation to ensure the created child is taken care of, and 
she should act, ceteris paribus, as the caring parent if the caring 
duties are unfulfilled.
conclusIon
In this paper, I explored whether MRT egg donors are paren-
tally responsible for the children created after an MRT proce-
dure under genetic accounts and causal accounts. Given that 
this was my only aim, I did not stop to investigate how and 
under what circumstances should the delegation, or transfer, 
of parental responsibilities occur. According to the most prom-
ising genetic account, the genetic/derivation account*, MRT egg 
donors are parentally responsible for the created children when 
the donation occurs with adequate informed consent. Now, two 
of the three causal accounts of parenthood that I explored yield 
the result that if adequate informed consent was obtained then 
MRT egg donors have parental, or maker, obligations towards 
the created children, and on the third account (the mere causal 
account) MRT egg donors are parentally responsible even if their 
eggs were obtained without consent, this fact is further proof 
that this account is inadequate. Let us finish this paper by stating 
that those who argue that children created after an MRT do not 
have three genetic parents, and that MRT egg donors have not 
parental obligations towards the created children need to revise 
their positions or come with new arguments for showing this.
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